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We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players 
simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, 
players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to 
influence the government’s choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using 
perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET), 
we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an "intuitive" hybrid 
solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not 
necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium lobby 
group is formed by the players with highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it a consecutive 
group with respect to their willingnesses-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium 
level of public goods provision shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated. 
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The menu auction theory developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) is widely used in
political economy models with lobbying, especially in the ﬁeld of international trade (e.g.,
Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Lobbying for protection can be considered as a public good
provision for the industry in question. Since the provision of the public good aﬀects all
players positively, they all have free-riding incentives. Thus, it is important to explicitly
model the stage of lobby formation to see if lobbying is eﬀectively conducted. We construct
a two-stage game of public good provision, where in the ﬁr s ts t a g ep l a y e r sd e c i d ei ft h e y
join a contribution group (a lobby). In the second stage, the participants of the contribution
group oﬀer their contribution schedules (menus) to the government, and the government
decides how much it provides the public good given the oﬀered contribution schedules and
the costs of public goods provision. In this context, we address following questions. How
serious is the free-riding problem? What types of players participate in the lobby? How
eﬃcient are equilibrium outcomes?
The set of Nash equilibria of our second stage game (a common agency game or menu
auction game) studied by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) is very large and contains many
unreasonable equilibria. In order to reﬁne it, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) deﬁne the
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE), a communication-based equilibrium concept with
credible enforcement, and provide a nice characterization of CPNE. In fact, since public
goods provision involves a coordination problem among players, it clearly makes sense to
employ communication-based reﬁnement of Nash equilibria in our game. To analyze our
two stage game, therefore, we employ perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE),
which is a natural extension of CPNE to dynamic games (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston,
1987). This solution concept has some merits: (i) it allows players to propose a (coalitional)
deviation plan in which they coordinate in their strategies through the communication, and
(ii) it assures that no free-riding incentive remains in equilibrium by requiring credibility of
proposed deviation plans.1 The second merit may require some clariﬁcations. Suppose that
1CPNE and PCPNE are strategy proﬁles that are immune to (recursively deﬁned) credible group devia-
2a subset of players participate in public goods contributions. In public goods economies, it
is always possible to improve eﬃciency in the Pareto manner by inviting nonparticipants to
the contribution group. Once such invitations are made, however, some of participants may
have an incentive to leave the contribution group since public goods provision level may still
be high enough after they leave the group. By adopting PCPNE as the equilibrium concept,
we can eliminate all free-riding incentives in equilibrium since PCPNE requires all possible
deviations to be credible.
We characterize the PCPNEs of our game by a novel hybrid solution concept, utilizing
the core in cooperative game theory. It is not a surprise that there are connections between
menu auction outcomes and the core. Laussel and Le Breton (2001) show that in the class
of comonotonic games,2 the generated cooperative games are convex, and the equivalence
between CPNE and the core results. We add a lobby formation stage to Laussel and Le
Breton (2001), and characterize PCPNE in order to analyze a participation problem. A free-
riding-proof core allocation for coalition S (FRP-Core allocation for S ) is a core allocation
achieved by contribution group S in which no member i of S has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally expecting the public good provision to become at the eﬃcient level for group
S\{i}.Afree-riding-proof core for S (FRP-Core for S ) is the collection of all FRP-Core
allocations for S. That is, the FRP-Core for S is the collection of all internally stable
allocations (no lobby member free-rides given a surplus allocation scheme). Note that it is
p o s s i b l et oh a v ea ne m p t yF R P - C o r ef o rS if S is a large coalition. The free-riding-proof
core (FRP-Core) is the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier of the union of FRP-Cores for all S ⊆ N.
That is, the FRP-Core is a collection of internally stable allocations that are not Pareto-
dominated by any other internally stable allocations. We prove that PCPNE and FRP-Core
are equivalent (Theorem 1), utilizing the properties of the core in convex games (Shapley,
1971).
This equivalence theorem is useful in analyzing the PCPNE of our game. We examine
tions with their strategies coordinated. A credible deviation is a deviation that is immune to further nested
credible deviations.
2Preferences are comonotonic if for all pair of players i and j,a n da l lp a i ro fa c t i o n sa and a0,i fi prefers
a to a0,t h e nj also prefers a to a0.
3the set of FRP-Core allocations of a simple example in which players diﬀer only in their
willingness-to-pay for a public good, and show that (i) there can be many diﬀerent equilib-
rium contribution groups, (ii) an equilibrium contribution group may not include the player
with the highest willingness-to-pay, and (iii) equilibrium contribution-group members may
not be consecutive in their willingness-to-pay.
Then, we analyze how equilibrium public goods provision is aﬀected as the economy
becomes larger. Following Milleron’s (1972) notion of replicating a public goods economy,3
we prove that the equilibrium public good provision level converges to zero as the economy
grows (Theorem 2).
This paper is organized as follows. The next two subsections brieﬂy discuss some related
literature. In Section 2, we set out our public goods provision game, and introduce PCPNE
as an equilibrium concept. We also describe how a version of “Protection for Sale" model
by Grossman and Helpman can be treated in our game. In Section 3, we deﬁne an intuitive
hybrid solution concept, the FRP-core, and prove the equivalence between PCPNE and the
FRP-core (Theorem 1). In Section 4, we provide an example to reveal some interesting
properties of the FRP-core. In Section 5, we consider a replica economy and show that the
public goods provision level shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated in a certain way
(Theorem 2). Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides useful properties of the core of
convex games and an algorithm that ﬁnds a core allocation starting with an arbitrary utility
vector; Appendix B provides proofs of our results.
1.1 Related Literature on Public Goods Provision
It is well known that the public goods provision is subject to free-riding incentives. Al-
though Samuelson’s (1954) view of this problem was pessimistic, Groves and Ledyard (1977)
show that eﬃcient public goods provision can be achieved in Nash equilibrium. Although
the Groves-Ledyard mechanism does not satisfy individual rationality, Hurwicz (1979) and
3Muench (1972), Milleron (1972) and Conley (1994) discuss the diﬃculty of replicating a public goods
economy and oﬀer various possible methods. Milleron’s notion of replication is to split endowments with
replicates and adjust preferences so that agents’ concerns for the private good are relative to the size of their
endowments. This notion is employed by Healy (2007).
4Walker (1981) show that the Lindahl mechanism is implementable. Subsequently, numerous
mechanisms have been proposed to improve the properties of mechanisms. They all assume,
however, that players have no freedom to make participation decisions about the mechanism,
i.e., players’ participation to the mechanism is always assumed.
Introducing outside opportunities by a “reversion function” (each outcome is mapped to
another outcome in the case of no participation), Jackson and Palfrey (2001) analyze the
implementation problem including participation of all players when players’ participation to
a mechanism is voluntary. They extend the Maskin monotonicity condition to accommodate
voluntary participation problem. Although their reversion function is very general, it assigns
the same outcome no matter who deviates from the original outcome. Thus, the method may
not be suitable for a public goods provision problem in which diﬀerent players’ deviations
from participation may generate diﬀerent outcomes. Taking this consideration into account,
Healy (2007) analyzes the implementation problem in a public goods economy demanding
all players’ participation in equilibrium (equilibrium participation). He shows that as the
economy is replicated in Milleron’s sense (1972), the set of outcomes of any mechanism that
satisﬁes the equilibrium participation condition converges to the endowment. Although we
also show that the equilibrium public goods provision level converges to zero as the economy
is replicated, we allow some players not to participate in the contribution group in equilibrium
(and eﬃciency of public good provision within the lobby group is achieved, unlike in Healy,
2007). Thus, Healy’s and our results are quite diﬀerent from each other.
Closest to our work is the one by Saijo and Yamato (1999), who are the ﬁrst to consider a
voluntary participation game with two stages in a public goods economy, without requiring
all players’ participation in equilibrium. They show a negative result on eﬃciency of public
goods provision, and then characterize subgame perfect equilibria in a symmetric Cobb-
Douglas utility case. In contrast, we fully characterize the PCPNE of a menu auction
(common agency) game with a participation decision allowing heterogeneous players that
have quasi-linear utility functions.4
4Shinohara (2003) derives the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium within the framework of Saijo and Yam-
ato’s (1999) voluntary participation game with the Lindahl mechanism in the second stage. He considers a
5Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) show that in a binary public goods provision game where
symmetric players voluntarily make participation decisions, all pure strategy Nash equilibria
are eﬃcient (if contributions are not refundable in case of no provision). With asymmetric
players, there are many Nash equilibria with diﬀerent levels of cooperation. Maruta and
Okada (2005) reﬁne those Nash equilibria by selecting the evolutionarily stable equilibria.
Shinohara (2007) examines a public goods provision problem with decreasing marginal bene-
ﬁts, and shows in the case of homogeneous players that it becomes harder to support eﬃcient
a l l o c a t i o n sa st h ee ﬃcient level of the public good rises and hence the number of partici-
pants needed to provide the public good increases. Our Theorem 2 has some similarity to
this result.5
Le Breton and Salaniè (2003) analyze a common agency problem with asymmetric in-
formation on agents’ preferences. They show that equilibria can be ineﬃcient even in the
case where there is only one player in each interest group.6 If there are multiple players in
each interest group, failure to internalize the contribution beneﬁts within the group reduces
contributions even more. Free-riding incentives under compulsory lobby participation exist
in the framework of Le Breton and Salaniè (2003), due to the failure of internalization. In
contrast, we analyze free-riding in a more obvious way by explicitly introducing participation
decisions.
case in which players are heterogeneous and shows that there can be multiple coalition-proof Nash equilibria
with diﬀerent sets of players participating in the mechanism. One of our results has the same message but
with a common agency game in the second stage (thus, payoﬀ allocation within lobby is ﬂexible unlike in
Shinohara 2003).
5Although the model and mechanism are very diﬀerent from ours, Nishimura and Shinohara (2007)
consider a multi-stage voluntary participation game in a discrete multi-unit public goods problem. They show
that Pareto-eﬃcient allocations are achieved in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium through a mechanism that
determines public goods provision unit-by-unit. Their eﬃciency result depends crucially on the assumption
that a player who did not participate in the mechanism in early stages can participate in the public good
provision later.
6Laussel and Le Breton (1998) analyze the public good provision problem where each player must sign a
participation contract before knowing her own cost when all contribution schemes are proposed (then players’
costs are realized and the agent chooses an agenda). They show that all equilibria are eﬃcient, and there is
no free-riding incentive.
61.2 Related Literature on International Trade
A seminar paper by Grossman and Helpman (1994) applies a menu auction (common agency)
game deﬁned by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to an endogenous trade policy formation
problem, and analyzes the mechanism in which industries inﬂuence the government’s trade
policy through lobbying activities. In their model, principals (or players) are the lobbies that
represent industries while the agent is the government that values contributions provided by
lobbies as well as social welfare. Each lobby makes contributions in order to inﬂuence the
trade policy in its favor: it lobbies to raise the price for the good that it makes and to lower
the prices for other goods.7 One of their intriguing results is that in some case, lobbying
activities oﬀset each other so that the government chooses free trade while collecting a large
a m o u n to fc o n t r i b u t i o n sf r o ma l lt h ei n d u s t r i e st h a th a v ec o n ﬂicting interests.
Mitra (1999) extends the Grossman-Helpman model to endogenize lobby participation.
In his model, participation decision is made at the industry level, abstracting from free-
riding incentive within the industry. He shows among others that Grossman and Helpman’s
(1994) aforementioned free-trade result still holds if the government cares about social welfare
strongly or if it cares about contributions heavily. In contrast, Bombardini (2007) and
Paltseva (2006) consider the cases in which ﬁrms in oligopolistic, import-competing industries
make participation decisions. Unlike Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Mitra (1999), ﬁrms
i nt h es a m ei n d u s t r yh a v en oc o n ﬂict of interests over government policies as in the pure
public goods provision problem.
Bombardini (2007) constructs the model in which ﬁrms are diﬀerent in the amount of
their speciﬁc capital and empirically investigates how protection levels diﬀer across industries
depending on the distribution of ﬁrm sizes. She ﬁnds that industries with wide ﬁrm-size
dispersion obtain high levels of protection. Although her empirical result is very interesting,
she assumes that the most eﬃcient lobby group is formed. Namely, she assumes that ﬁrms
enter the lobby in the descending order of their capital: the ﬁrm with the largest capital enters
the lobby, then the ﬁrm with the second largest capital enters and so on, until the eﬃciency
7This is because lobbies representing industries are ultimately consumers.
7beneﬁto fa d d i n gaﬁrm becomes smaller than the ﬁrm’s individual cost of lobby participation.
Indeed, we show by giving an example that it is not necessary that the equilibrium lobby
i n c l u d e st h em o s te ﬃcient ﬁrm, nor is it necessary that the lobby members are consecutive
in their eﬃciencies.
Paltseva (2006) considers a lobby-participation game with symmetric ﬁrms to analyze
their free-riding incentives, and examines the symmetric Nash equilibrium outcomes of the
participants’ menu auction. Our paper is closest to Paltseva’s within the ﬁeld of international
trade, but we allow asymmetric players and asymmetric contributions, and characterize all
PCPNEs. Due to transferable utilities, we need to employ a more sophisticated equilibrium
concept than Nash equilibrium in the participation stage if the symmetry assumption is
dropped. That is why we use PCPNE as our solution concept.
2 The Model
This section sets out the two-stage contribution game in which all players’ interests are in the
same direction, while the intensity of their interests can be heterogeneous. We ﬁrst describe
the problem, then propose the FRP-core as a hybrid solution concept.
2.1 Public Goods Provision Problem
A stylized public goods model is deﬁned as follows. There is a public good whose provision
level is denoted by a ∈ A = R+.8 Provision cost function C : A → R+ is continuous and
strictly increasing with C(0) = 0. The government provides the public good, and its cost is
regarded as the government’s disutility from the provision. That is, the government’s utility
from providing a units of the public good is vG(a)=−C(a).P l a y e r i’s utility function is
quasi-linear such that the net consumption x of the private goods enter the function linearly,
i.e., vi(a)−x,w h e r evi : A → R+ is a strictly increasing function with vi(0) = 0.I no r d e rt o
guarantee the existence of a non-trivial solution, we assume that (i) there exists ˜ a ∈ A such
8For our equivalence result (Theorem 1), we only need comonotonic preferences over abstract agenda
set A. The extension is straightforward. We focus on the one-dimensional public goods economy just for
simplicity.
8that vi(˜ a) − C(˜ a) > 0 for all i ∈ N,w h e r eN is the set of players, and (ii) there is ˆ a ∈ A
such that
P
i∈N vi(a)−C(a) < 0 for all a>ˆ a. The only new element to this standard public
goods provision game is that every player has a choice between participating in contributing
to the public goods provision and free-riding.
2.2 Voluntary Participation
We discuss the endogenous contribution-group formation and its consequences on the public
good provision. To this end, we do not only require the menu auction stage of public good
provision to be coalition-proof, but require the contribution-group formation itself to be
coalition-proof. To do so, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the ﬁrst-stage group-formation game in an
appropriate manner, assuming that the outcome of each possible group S is a coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium of a common agency game played by S. As an extension of CPNE in the
strategic form games to the one in the extensive form games, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston
(1987) deﬁne the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) as the coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium for multi-stage games.
The ﬁrst-stage group-formation game is such that each player i ∈ N chooses her action
from the set Σ1
i = {0,1},w h e r e0 and 1 represent non-participation and participation,
respectively, i.e., player i announces her participation decision. Once action proﬁle σ1 =
(σ1
1,...,σ1
n) ∈ Σ1 = Πj∈NΣ1
j is selected, then the contribution game takes place in the second
stage with the set of active players S(σ1)={i ∈ N : σ1
i =1 }.9
The second-stage game is a menu auction game (or a common agency game) played by
participating principals S(σ1) (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). The set N\S(σ1) is the set
of passive free-riders. Each player i ∈ S(σ1) simultaneously oﬀers a contribution schedule
τi : A → R+.G i v e n t h e p r o ﬁle of contribution schedules τS(σ1),t h eg o v e r n m e n tG (the
9In our model, there will be a single coalition lobbying for (or contributing to) the public goods provision.
In contrast, Ray and Vohra (2001) analyze a dynamic coalition bargaining of a public goods provision
problem with multiple resulting coalitions. For detailed surveys on coalition formation problems with multiple
coalitions (and externalities), see Bloch (1997) and Ray (2007). We do not allow multiple lobbying groups
to be faced with multiple agents (such as local governments), since the analysis would become exceedingly
complicated in such cases.









where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the last equation is the total contribution and
the second term is the cost of public goods provision. If the government chooses a ∈ A,t h e n
player i obtains her payoﬀ
ui(a,τi(a)) = vi(a) − τi(a),
for i ∈ S(σ1),a n d
ui(a)=vi(a),





In this game, the government is not a player; it is just an automaton that maximizes its payoﬀ
given the contribution schedules.10 Let T be the set of all contribution plans τ : A → R+.
Player i’s second stage strategy σ2
i is a mapping σ2
i :2 N\{∅} → T : i.e., a contribution
schedule is assigned to each subgame. Note that in subgame S ∈ 2N\{∅},i fi/ ∈ S,t h e n
σ2
i(S):A → R+ is irrelevant to the outcome. The set of player i’s second-stage strategies is
denoted by Σ2
i.
2.2.1 Example: Grossman-Helpman Model with a Single Industry
Here, we show how the above game can be accommodated to a single-industry version of
the “Protection for Sale” model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Suppose
that there is only one import competing industry with n ﬁr m si nas m a l lo p e nc o u n t r y .
Firms with possibly diﬀerent levels of speciﬁc capital produce a homogenous commodity;
the government may provide a tariﬀ protection to the industry. The domestic price of the
10Strictly speaking, since the government may have multiple optimal policies, we need to introduce a tie-
breaking rule. However, it is easy to show that the set of truthful equilibria (see below) would not depend
o nt h ec h o i c eo ft i e - b r e a k i n gr u l e s .
10commodity is ˜ p = p + t,w h e r ep and t denote the world price and speciﬁct a r i ﬀ rate for
the commodity, respectively. Each ﬁrm i has a (reduced-form) proﬁtf u n c t i o nπi(˜ p),o rt h e
rent to its speciﬁc capital, which is strictly increasing in ˜ p. The government cares about













where CS(˜ p) denotes a consumer surplus that is decreasing in ˜ p,a n dD(˜ p) and qi(˜ p) denote
consumer demands and ﬁrm i’s supply, respectively. The expression in the parentheses shows
the import level, and hence the last term represents the tariﬀ revenue. Social welfare can be
rewritten as
W(p,t)=W(p,0) − L(p,t),
where L(p,t) denotes the deadweight loss as Figure 1 illustrates. Note that W(p,0) is a
constant since the world price p is ﬁxed for this small open economy. Thus, the government’s
payoﬀ function can be reduced further to vG(t)=−L(p,t) with the normalization W(p,0) =
0. Similarly, ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ function can be written as vi(t)=πi(p + t) − πi(p) as p is a
constant.
Now we are ready to map the “protection for sale” model to our public goods provision
framework. Let S be the set of contribution-group participants in the set of ﬁrms N,a n d
others be free-riders. The contribution schedule for ﬁrm i ∈ S is τi : T → R+,w h e r eT = R









while ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ function is
ui(t,τi(t)) = vi(t) − τi(t)
= πi(p + t) − πi(p) − τi(t),
11for i ∈ S,a n d
ui(t)=vi(t),
for i/ ∈ S. Thus, the “Protection for Sale” model with a single industry is described by our
public goods provision model with t = a, L(p,t)=C(a),a n dπi(p + t) − πi(p)=vi(a).
We endogenize ﬁrms’ lobby participation decision in our game. Paltseva (2007) considers
a symmetric-ﬁrm version of this extended “protection for sale” game with symmetric contri-
bution schedules. Although Bombardini (2007) does not model ﬁrms’ participation decision
as a game, the rest is the same as the above lobbying game except that she assumes that
the lobby participation is costly.11
2.3 Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium in the Contribution-
Group Participation Game
Now, we deﬁne PCPNE for our two-stage game, following Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston
(1987). Player i’s strategy σi =( σ1
i,σ2
i) ∈ Σi = Σ1
i × Σ2
i is such that σ1
i ∈ Σ1
i denotes i’s
lobby participation choice, and σ2
i ∈ Σ2
i is a function σ2
i :2 N\{∅} → T ,w h e r eT is the set
of all functions τ : A → R+.12 Each player’s payoﬀ function is ui : Σ → R,w h i c hi sg i v e ni n
the contribution game when contribution group S is determined by S(σ1).
For T ⊆ N,w ec o n s i d e rareduced game Γ(T,σ−T) in which only players in T are active
while players in N \ T are passive such that they always choose σ−T.W e a l s o c o n s i d e r
subgames for every σ1 ∈ Σ1,a n dreduced subgames Γ(T,σ1,σ 2
−T) in similar ways. A perfectly
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) (σ∗,a ∗)=( ( σ1∗
i ,σ 2∗
i )i∈N,a ∗) is deﬁned recursively
as follows.13
(a) In a single-player, single-stage subgame Γ({i},σ1,σ2
−{i}),t h es t r a t e g yσ2∗
i (S(σ1)) ∈ T
11Our Theorem 1 holds even in the existence of individual lobby participation costs.
12For notational simplicity, we include outsiders’ second-stage strategies in the strategy proﬁle. Of course,
such a non-participant’s second-stage strategies are absolutely irrelevant to the outcome since the government
does not receive contributions from them.
13Note that in Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987), the deﬁnition of PCPNE is based on strictly
improving coalitional deviations. However, we adopt a deﬁnition based on weakly improving coalitional
deviations, since the theorem on menu auction in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) uses CPNE based on
weakly improving deviation. For details on these two deﬁnitions, see Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999).
12and the agenda a∗ chosen by the agent is PCPNE if σ2∗
i maximizes ui through the
choice of a∗.
(b) Let (n,t) be the pair of the number of players and the number of stages of the reduced
(sub-) game, where t ∈ {1,2}. Pick any pair of positive integers (m,r) ≤ (n,t) with
(m,r) 6=( n,t). For all T ⊆ N with |T| ≤ m, assume that PCPNE has been deﬁned
for all reduced games Γ(T,σ−T) and for their subgames Γ(T,σ1,σ2
−T) (if r =1 ,t h e n
only for all reduced subgames Γ(T,σ1,σ 2
−T)). Then,
(i) for all reduced games Γ(S,σ−S) and for their subgames Γ(S,σ1,σ2
−S) with |S| = n,
(σ∗,a ∗) ∈ Σ×A is perfectly self-enforcing if for all T ⊂ S we have that (σ∗
T,a ∗) is
PCPNE of the reduced game Γ(T,σ∗
S\T,σ−S),a n dσ2∗





(ii) for all S ⊆ N with |S| = n, (σ∗
S,a ∗) is a PCPNE of the reduced game Γ(S,σ−S)
if (σ∗
S,a ∗) is perfectly self-enforcing in reduced game Γ(S,σ−S), and there is no
other perfectly self-enforcing σ0
S such that ui (σ0
S,σ −S) ≥ ui (σ∗
S,σ−S) for every
i ∈ S with at least one strict inequality.
For any T ⊆ N and any strategy proﬁle σ, let PCPNE(Γ(T,σ−T)) denote the set of
PCPNE strategy proﬁles for T in the game Γ(T,σ−T). For any strategy proﬁle (σ,a),as t r a t e -
gic coalitional deviation (T,σ0
T,a 0) from (σ,a) is credible if (σ0
T,a 0) ∈ PCPNE(Γ(T,σ−T)).
AP C P N Ei sas t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle that is immune to any credible coalitional deviation. An
outcome allocation for (σ∗,a ∗) is a list (S,a∗,u,u G) ∈ 2N × A × RN × R,w h e r eS = S(σ1∗)
and (u,uG) is the resulting utility allocation for players.
There are two remarks to be made on PCPNE.
First, if a coalition T wants to deviate in the ﬁrst stage within the reduced game Γ(T,σ−T)
(thus keeping the outsiders’ strategy proﬁle ﬁxed), it can orchestrate the whole plan of the
13deviation by assigning a new CPNE to each subgame so that the target allocation (by the
deviation) would be attained as PCPNE of the reduced game Γ(T,σ−T).
Second, the deﬁnition of PCPNE coincides with the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
(CPNE) in the (static) second stage. Thus, a CPNE needs to be assigned to each subgame.
There are useful characterizations of CPNE of a menu auction (common agency) game in
the literature. Consider subgame S. Let us denote player i’s strategy in this subgame
σ2
i(S):A → R+ by τi : A → R+. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) introduce a concept
of truthful strategies, where τi is truthful relative to ¯ a if and only if for all a ∈ A either
vi(a) − τi(a)=vi(¯ a) − τi(¯ a),o rvi(a) − τi(a) <v i(¯ a) − τi(¯ a) with τi(a)=0 .A truthful
Nash equilibrium (τ∗
S,a ∗) is a Nash equilibrium such that τ∗
i is truthful relative to a∗ ∈ A
for all i ∈ S. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that (i) every truthful equilibrium is
a CPNE, and (ii) the set of truthful equilibria and that of CPNE in the utility space are
equivalent, and provide a nice characterization of CPNE in the utility space. Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) further analyze CPNE in utility space. One of many results in Laussel and
Le Breton (2001) provides a characterization of CPNE under a special (yet useful) property,
comonotonic payoﬀ property: ui(a) ≥ ui(a0) if and only if uj(a) ≥ uj(a0) for all i,j ∈ S and
all a,a0 ∈ A. Obviously, this property is satisﬁed in our public good provision problem.
Fact. (Laussel and Le Breton 2001) Consider a menu auction (common agency) problem
Γ =( S,A,(T ,v i)i∈S,C) played by the set S of the principals and the agent G with a
comonotonic payoﬀ property. Then, in all CPNEs of the menu auction game, agent G obtains
uG =m a x a∈A −C(a) (no rent property), and the set of CPNE in utility space is equivalent
to the core of the characteristic function game (˜ V (T))T⊆S,w h e r e˜ V (T)=V (T) − uG =
maxa∈A
¡P
i∈T vi(a) − C(a)
¢
− uG.14
14In the public goods provision problem, uG = −C(0) = 0,t h u s˜ V (T)=V (T) for all T ⊆ S.A p a y o ﬀ
vector uS =( ui)i∈S is in the core if and only if
P
i∈S ui = V (S),a n d
P
i∈T ui ≥ V (T) for all T ⊂ S.
143 The Main Result
Now, we characterize PCPNE. To do so, we ﬁrst deﬁne an intuitive hybrid solution concept,
free-riding-proof core (FRP-core), which is the set of the Foley-core allocations that are
immune to free-riding incentives and are Pareto-optimal in a constrained sense.15 The FRP-
core is always nonempty in the public good provision problem.
The public good provision problem determines two things: (i) which group provides
public goods and how much, and (ii) how to allocate the beneﬁts from the public good
among the members of the group (or how to share the cost). For S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅,l e t























i∈S vi(a)−C(a),a n duj = vj(a)
for all j/ ∈ S (utility allocation). An eﬃcient allocation for S is an allocation (S,a,u) such
that
P
i∈S ui = V (S) with a = a∗(S).N o t et h a tN\S are passive free-riders, and they do not
contribute at all. Given that S is the contribution group, a natural way to allocate utility
among the members is to use the core (Foley 1970). A core allocation for S, (S,a∗(S),u),i s
an eﬃcient allocation for S such that
P
i∈T ui ≥ V (T) holds for all T ⊆ S.
However, a core allocation for S may not be immune to free-riding incentives by the mem-
bers of S.S ow ed e ﬁne a hybrid solution concept of cooperative and noncooperative games.
A FRP-core allocation for S (FRP-core allocation for S ) is a core allocation (S,a∗(S),u)
for S such that
ui ≥ vi(a
∗(S\{i})) for any i ∈ S.
An FRP-core allocation for S is immune to unilateral deviations by the members of S.N o t e
that, given the nature of the public goods provision problem, we can allow a coalitional devi-
ation from S at no cost (since one-person deviation is the most proﬁtable). Let CoreFRP(S)
15The Foley core of our public good economy is the standard core concept assuming that deviating coali-
tions have to provide public goods by themselves. That is, it assumes that there is no spillover of public
goods across the groups.
15be the set of all FRP-core allocations for S. For a large group S, CoreFRP(S) may be
empty, whereas for small groups it is nonempty (especially, for singleton groups it is always
nonempty). We collect FRP-core allocations for all S, and take their Pareto frontiers. The
















That is, an element of CoreFRP is a FRP-core allocation for some S that is not weakly
dominated by any other FRP-core allocation for any T.N o t et h a tCoreFRP,o n l ya c h i e v i n g
constrained eﬃciency due to free-riding incentives, is not as u b s o l u t i o no fCore(N).C o n t r a r y
to the fact that CoreFRP(N) is often empty, there always exists a FRP-core allocation, since
CoreFRP(S) is nonempty for all singleton sets S = {i}.
Proposition 1. CoreFRP 6= ∅.
Now, we will characterize PCPNE by the FRP-core. In the public goods provision prob-
lem, the above Fact (Laussel and Le Breton 2001) implies that the second-stage CPNE
outcomes coincide with the set of all core allocations of a characteristic function form game
for S with (V (T))T⊆S where V (T)=m a x a∈A
¡P
i∈T vi(a) − C(a)
¢
.16 This is nothing but
Foley’s core in a public goods economy for S (Foley, 1970). This observation gives us some
insight in our two-stage noncooperative game. First, for each subgame characterized by
S0 = S(σ10), the utility outcome uS0 must be in the core of (V (T))T⊆S0. Second, given the
setup of our group-formation game in the ﬁrst stage, if a CPNE outcome u in a subgame
S can be realized as the equilibrium outcome (on-equilibrium path), it is necessary that
u ∈ CoreFRP(S), since otherwise some member of S would deviate in the ﬁrst stage obtain-
ing a secured free-riding payoﬀ. This observation is useful in our analysis of the equivalence
theorem. With some constructions, we can show the following:
16Indeed, CPNE and strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann 1959) with weakly improving deviations are
equivalent in a menu auction (common agency) game with no-rent property. See Konishi, Le Breton, and
Weber (1999).
16Proposition 2. If an allocation (S,a∗(S),u) is in the FRP-core, then there is a PCPNE σ
whose outcome is (S,a∗(S),u).
We relegate the proof of Proposition 2 to the Appendix B (with some preliminary analyses
in the Appendix A). Here, we only describe how to construct PCPNE σ.F i r s t ,i nd e ﬁning
σ, we need to assign a CPNE utility proﬁle to every subgame that corresponds to a coalition
S ⊆ N. Since the second-stage strategy proﬁle is described by utility allocations assigned to
each subgame, we partition the set of subgames S = {S ∈ 2N : S 6= ∅} into three categories:
(i) S1 = {S∗} on the equilibrium path, which is the contribution group formed in equilibrium,
(ii) S2 = {S ∈ S : S ∩ S∗ = ∅}, and (iii) S3 = {S ∈ S\S1 : S ∩ S∗ 6= ∅}. As Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) show, a CPNE outcome in a subgame S0 corresponds to a core allocation for
S0. To support the equilibrium path (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) ∈ CoreFRP by a PCPNE, we need to
show that there is no credible deviation in the ﬁrst stage. This requires careful assignments
of core allocations to all subgames.
We prove Proposition 2 by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that there is a
credible deviation T from S∗, which leads to the formation of lobby S0 after the devia-
tion. Then, for all members of T,b o t hproﬁtability of deviation and free-riding-proofness
must be satisﬁed. Thus, for every player i ∈ T, the post deviation payoﬀ u0
i must satisfy
u0
i ≥ ¯ ui =m a x {u∗
i,v i(S0\{i})}. The case where S0 ∩ S∗ 6= ∅ is most subtle. We show
that even in such cases, if there were such a deviation, there would exist an allocation
(S0,a ∗(S0),u 0) ∈ CoreFRP(S0) that Pareto-dominates (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗). This contradicts the
assumption that (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) ∈ CoreFRP. We show Pareto-domination by using the fact
that the utility allocation assigned to subgame S0 under σ is a core allocation, and construct
a core allocation by the algorithm that is provided in Appendix A.
Once this direction of the relationship between the FRP-core and PCPNE is estab-
lished, the converse is trivial. The PCPNE requires free-riding-proofness. Thus, every
PCPNE must be a FRP-core allocation for some S.S i n c e CoreFRP is the Pareto-frontier
of ∪S⊆NCoreFRP(S), Proposition 2 indeed implies that any Pareto-dominated FRP-core
allocation for S can be defeated by a FRP-core allocation.
17Theorem 1. An allocation (S,a∗(S),u) is in the FRP-core if and only if there is a PCPNE
σ whose outcome is (S,a∗(S),u).
Proof. We prove the converse of the relationship described in Proposition 2, i.e., we show
that every PCPNE σ generates a FRP-core allocation as its outcome. It is easy to see that the
outcome (S,a∗(S),u) of a PCPNE σ i saF R P - c o r ea l l o c a t i o n( a n dn o tj u s tc o r ea l l o c a t i o n )
for S, since otherwise a player would have an incentive to free-ride in the ﬁrst stage of
the extension game and hence the resulting allocation will not be a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. Thus, (S,a∗(S),u) ∈ CoreFRP(S).N o w , s u p p o s e t h a t u/ ∈ CoreFRP. Then,
there is a FRP-core allocation (S0,a ∗(S0),u 0) ∈ CoreFRP with u0 >u . Proposition 2 further
implies that a deviation by the grand coalition N can attain u0 with a PCPNE σ0.T h i s
means that there is a credible coalitional deviation from σ, which leads to a contradiction.
Thus, every PCPNE achieves a FRP-core allocation. ¤
This result crucially depends on the “comonotonicity of preferences” (Laussel and Le
Breton, 2003), and perfectly nonexcludable public goods (free riders can fully enjoy public
goods). Without these assumptions, the above equivalence may not hold.
Although the FRP-core is much easier to grasp than PCPNE, it may still not be clear
how the FRP-core looks like. A simple example in the next section illustrates the properties
of FRP-core allocations and thus the outcome of PCPNE.
4 An Example: Linear Utility and Quadratic Cost
Let vi(a)=θia for any i ∈ N and C(a)=a2/2,w h e r eθi > 0 is a preference parameter.
Here in this section, we identify players by their preference parameters, i.e., θi = i for any
i ∈ N. Then, the optimal level of the public good for group S is determined by the ﬁrst-order
condition
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Consider the following example.
Example 1. Let N = {11,5,3,1},w h e r eθi = i for each i ∈ N.
First we check if the grand coalition S = N is supportable. When S = N,w eh a v e
a∗(N)=
P
i∈N i =2 0 ,a n dV (N)=2 0 2/2=2 0 0 . For the allocation to be free-riding-proof,
each player must obtain the following payoﬀ at the very least:
v11(a
∗(N\{11})) = (20 − 11) × 11 = 99,
v5(a
∗(N\{5})) = (20 − 5) × 5=7 5 ,
v3(a
∗(N\{3})) = (20 − 3) × 3=5 1 ,
v1(a
∗(N\{1})) = (20 − 1) × 1=1 9 .
The sum of all these values exceeds the value of the grand coalition V (N).A sar e s u l t ,w e
can conclude CoreFRP(N)=∅.
• T h eF R P - c o r ef o rt h eg r a n dc o a l i t i o nN m a yb ee m p t y .T h u s ,t h eF R P - c o r em a yb e
suboptimal.
Next, consider S = {11,5}. Then, a∗(S)=1 6 ,a n dV (S)=1 2 8 . In order to check if the
FRP-core for S is nonempty, we ﬁrst check again the free-riding incentives.
v(a
∗(S\{11})) = (16 − 11) × 11 = 55,
v(a
∗(S\{5})) = (16 − 5) × 5=5 5 .
19Thus, if there is a FRP-core allocation for S, u =( u11,u 5) must satisfy











where the last two conditions are obtained by the core requirement. That is, we have17
Core({11,5})
= {u ∈ R
5




= {u ∈ R
5
+ : u11 + u5 =1 2 8 ,u 11 ≥ 60.5,u 5 ≥ 55,u 3 =4 8 ,u 2 =3 2 ,u 1 =1 6 }.
It is readily seen that CoreFRP({11,5}) 6= ∅, but it is a smaller set than Core({11,5}).
• Free-riding-proof constraints may narrow the set of attainable core allocations for a
coalition.
Note that in this case, only the free-riding incentive constraint for player 5 is binding. It is
better for player 11 to provide public goods alone than free-riding on player 5. ¤
Now, let us analyze the FRP-core. Since the FRP-core requires Pareto-eﬃciency on the
union of FRP-cores over all subsets S of the players, we ﬁrst need to ﬁn dt h eF R P - c o r ef o r
each S. In general, even a minimal task of checking the nonemptiness of the FRP-core for S
i sn o te a s y ,s i n c et h eF R P - c o r ef o rS demands two almost unrelated requirements: immunity
to coalitional deviation attempts and to free-riding incentives. However, it is easy to narrow
17For notational simplicity, we abuse notations by dropping irrelevant arguments of allocations. Thus, in
this subsection, allocations are utility allocations.
20down the candidates by using a necessary condition for the nonemptiness of the FRP-core
for S.
Proposition 3. In the case of linear utility and quadratic cost, if the FRP-core for S is
nonempty, then S satisﬁes the following aggregate “no free-riding condition.”

































The proof is straightforward and hence omitted. By utilizing this proposition, we can char-
acterize the FRP-core of the public goods economy in Example 1.
Example 1. (continued) The FRP-core allocations are attained by groups {11,5,1},
{11,3,1}, {11,5}, {11,3},a n d{5,3}.
First, by applying Proposition 3, we ﬁnd that there are 12 contribution groups that satisfy
the necessary condition for the nonempty FRP-core for S: {11,5,1}, {11,3,1}, {11,5},
{11,3}, {11,1}, {5,3}, {5,1}, {3,1}, {11}, {5}, {3},a n d{1}.
T h eF R P - c o r ef o rS = {11,5,3} is empty, for example. For S = {11,5,3},w eh a v e
a∗(S)=1 9and V (S)=1 8 0 .5.S i n c e11v(a∗(S\{11})) = 88, 5v(a∗(S\{5})=7 0 , 3v(a∗(S\{3})) =
48,a n d88+70+48 > 180.5, the necessary condition for S = {11,5,3} to give a FRP-core al-
location is violated. As we see, however, CoreFRP({11,5,1}) is not empty. Thus {11,5,1} is
the group that achieves the highest level of public good while having a nonempty FRP-core.18
This analysis provides an interesting observation.
• (Even the largest) group that achieves a FRP-core allocation may not be consecutive.19
18As shown below, group {11,5,1} supports some allocations in CoreFRP.
19Although the context and approach are very diﬀerent, in political science and sociology, the formation
of such non-consecutive coalitions is of tremendous interest. For a game-theoretical treatment of this line of
literature (known and “Gamson’s law”), see Le Breton et al. (2007).
21The intuition behind this result is simple. Suppose Φ(S) is positive (say, S = {11,5}).
Now, we try to ﬁnd S0 ⊃ S that still satisﬁes Φ(S0) ≥ 0.I ft h ev a l u eo fΦ(S) is positive yet
not too large, then adding a player with high θ (say, player 3)m a ym a k eΦ(S0) < 0,s i n c e
adding such a player may greatly increase a∗(S0), making the free-riding problem severer.
On the contrary, adding a player with low θ (say, player 1)d o e sn o tm a k et h ef r e e - r i d e r
problem too severe, so Φ(S0) ≥ 0 may be satisﬁed relatively easily.
Among the above 12 groups, it is easy to see that groups {5,1}, {3,1}, {11}, {5}, {3},
and {1} do not survive the test of Pareto-domination. For example, consider S0 = {11,5}
and u0 =( 7 3 ,55,48,16) ∈ CoreFRP({11,5}). This is the best allocation for player 11 in
CoreFRP({11,5}) as the characterization of CoreFRP({11,5}) in the above indicates. Players
other than 11 and 5 are free-riders, and their payoﬀs are directly generated from a∗({11,5})=
16. Now it is straightforward to see that the allocation u0 dominates all allocations for the
above six groups; public good provision levels of those groups are insuﬃcient compared with
a∗({11,5})=1 6 .
On the contrary, {5,3} is not dominated by any FRP-core allocations for any contribution
group. We can show that player 11 can obtain at most 73 in a FRP-core allocation for any
S 3 11, whereas she obtains 88 by free-riding on {5,3}.T h u s ,p l a y e r 11 would not join a
deviation. Without player 11’s cooperation, no free-riding core allocation that dominates
those of {5,3} can be realized.
Similarly, FRP-core allocations for S = {11,1} are dominated by the one for S0 = {11,5}.
Under S = {11,1},p l a y e r5 obtains 60,b u tS0 can attain u0 =( 6 3 ,65,48,16). Free-riding-
proof core allocations for {11,3,1} and {11,3} cannot be beaten, however, by the ones for
S0 = {11,5};p l a y e r5, for example, gets 70 even under {11,3} while she would obtain at
most 67.5 under S0 = {11,5} as we can see from CoreFRP({11,5}) derived in the above.
Finally, consider S = {11,5}, {11,3}. The FRP-core allocations for S = {11,5} are
characterized by u11 + u5 =1 2 8 , u11 ≥ 60.5 and u5 ≥ 55,w i t hu3 =4 8and u1 =1 6 .N o w ,




1 =1 4 4 .5, u0
11 + u0
5 ≥ 128, u0
11 ≥ 66, u0
5 ≥ 60,a n du0
1 ≥ 16,w i t hu0





1 ≥ 72 are satisﬁed because u0
11 ≥ 66, u0
5 ≥ 60,a n du0
1 ≥ 16.) Here, S0 can attain
u0
11+u0
5 =1 4 4 .5−16 = 128.5 as long as u0
11 ≥ 66 and u0
5 ≥ 60.T h u s ,i fu ∈ CoreFRP({11,5})
satisﬁes u11+u5 =1 2 8 , 60.5 ≤ u11 ≤ 68.5,a n d55 ≤ u5 ≤ 62.5,t h e nu is improved upon by an
allocation in CoreFRP({11,5,1}). However, if u ∈ CoreFRP({11,5}) satisﬁes u11+u5 =1 2 8 ,
u11 > 68.5,o ru5 > 62.5,t h e nu cannot be improved upon by group {11,5,1}.T h eF R P -
core allocations for S = {11,3} have a similar property with possible deviations by group
S0 = {11,3,1}. This phenomenon illustrates another interesting observation:
• An expansion of a group deﬁnitely increases the total value of the group, while it gives
less ﬂexibility in allocating the beneﬁts among the group members since free-riding
incentives increase as the level of the public good provision rises. As a result, some
unequal FRP-core allocations for the original group may not be improved upon by the
group expansion.
In summary, the FRP-core is the union of the following sets of allocations attained by
the ﬁve diﬀerent groups.
1. S = {11,5,1}; a∗(S)=1 7and all FRP-core allocations for S are included:
Core
FRP({11,5,1})
= {u ∈ R
5
+ : u11 + u5 + u1 =1 4 4 .5,u 3 =5 1 ,u 11 ≥ 66,u 5 ≥ 60,u 1 ≥ 16.}
2. S = {11,3,1}; a∗(S)=1 5and all FRP-core allocations for S are included:
Core
FRP({11,3,1})
= {u ∈ R
5
+ : u11 + u3 + u1 =1 1 2 .5,u 5 =7 5 ,u 11 ≥ 60.5,u 3 ≥ 36,u 1 ≥ 14}.
3. S = {11,5}; a∗(S)=1 6and only a subset of FRP-core allocations for S is included:
©
u ∈ Core
FRP({11,5}):u11 > 68.5 or u5 > 62.5
ª
= {u ∈ R
5
+ : u11 + u5 =1 2 8 ,u 3 =4 8 , ˜ u1 =1 6 ,68.5 <u 11 ≤ 73or 62.5 <u 5 ≤ 67.5}





= {u ∈ R
5
+ : u11 + u3 =9 8 ,u 5 =7 0 ,u 1 =1 4 ,62.5 <u 11 ≤ 65}
5. S = {5,3}; a∗(S)=8and all FRP-core allocations for S are included:
Core
FRP({5,3})
= {u ∈ R
5
+ : u5 + u3 =3 2 ,u 11 =8 8 , ˜ u1 =8 ,u 5 ≥ 15,u 3 ≥ 15}
¤
Before closing this section, let us compare the FRP-core allocations with a Nash equilib-
rium of a simultaneous move voluntary public goods provision game studied by Bergstrom,
Blume, and Varian (1986). Each player i chooses her monetary contribution mi ≥ 0 to ﬁnance





the cost function of public goods production C(a)=a2/2.C o n s i d e r p l a y e r i.G i v e n t h a t
others contribute M−i in total, player i chooses mi so as to maximize θi
p
2(mi + M−i)−mi.
The best response for player i is m∗






. It is easy to see that in our
example, only player 11 contributes, so the public goods provision level is 11. Thus, by
forming a contribution group in the ﬁrst stage, it is possible to increase the equilibrium level
of the public good provision. But it is also possible that the level of public good provision is
lower than the Nash equilibrium provision level of the standard voluntary contribution game,
as we have found that group {5,3} achieves some FRP-core allocations in our example.
• There may be FRP-core allocations that achieve lower public goods provision levels
than the Nash equilibrium outcome of a simple voluntary contribution game studied by
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986).
This occurs because in our setup, player 11 can commit to being an outsider in the ﬁrst
stage, which cannot happen in a simultaneous-move voluntary contribution game. Finally,
needless to say, we have:
24• The FRP-core may be a highly nonconvex set as diﬀe r e n ta l l o c a t i o n sm a yb er e a l i z e d
by diﬀerent contribution groups.
5 Replicated Economies
In this section, we analyze whether or not public goods provision and the participation rate
decrease as an economy is replicated. There is a tricky issue in replicating a (pure) public
goods economy. If the set of consumers is simply replicated, the amount of resources in the
economy grows to inﬁnity, while maintaining the same cost function for public good produc-
tion. Following Milleron’s (1972) method, Healy (2007) makes each consumer’s endowment
shrink proportionally to the population as the economy is replicated to overcome this prob-
lem; consumers’ preferences are also modiﬁed in the replication process.20 We adopt the
same preference modiﬁcation in the replication of a quasi-linear economy. We shrink each
consumer’s willingness-to-pay function (and thus utility function) proportionally as the econ-
omy is replicated. This way of replication is natural for a quasi-linear economy, since the
aggregate willingness-to-pay and cost functions stay the same in the replication process.
The original economy is a list E =( N,(vi)i∈N,C).L e tr =1 ,2,3,... be a natural number.
The rth replica of E is a list Er =( Nr,(vr




rvi(a) for all q =1 ,..,r.21 Let a characteristic function form game generated
from Er be V r.
Each PCPNE of a contribution-group participation game generated from Er has a corre-
sponding FRP-core allocation (S,a∗(S),u ∗) of the characteristic function form game V r.
Note that for any r,a n df o ra n yS ⊆ Nr, the public good provision level a = a∗(S)
is determined so that the sum of willingness-to-pay across all members of S equal the
marginal cost of public good provision, i.e.,
P
iq∈S vr0
iq(a)=C0(a). Furthermore, we need
20Conley (1994) uses a diﬀerent deﬁnition of replicated economy, and investigates the convergence of the
core.
21Let x and a denote the consumption level of a private good and the level of a public good, and let ºi
and ºr
i be preference relations in the original and rth replica economy, respectively. According to Milleron’s
(1972) preference modiﬁcation, relation ºr
i is generated such that (x,a) ºr
i (x0,a 0) if (rx,a) ºi (rx0,a 0).I n









≥ C(a∗(S)) in order to satisfy the free-riding-proofness,
where the terms in the parentheses on the left-hand side indicate how much each player can
pay without sacriﬁcing the free-riding-proofness. Let mi(S) ∈ {0,···,r} denote the number












where it should be understood that S\{iq} denote the set of all players but one type i player









Now, consider the kth replication, where k =1 ,2,···,o ft h i srth replica of the original
economy, which implies that each player in the rth replica of the original economy is divided
into k players. Let Sk be a coalition in this k × rth replica economy that contains all k
replica players of all members of S in rth replica economy. Obviously, a∗(S) in rth replica
economy equals a∗(Sk) in k×rth replica economy. However, although the coeﬃcients satisfy
mi(S)/r = mi(Sk)/(kr), a∗(Sk\{i}) converges to a∗(Sk)=a∗(S) as k goes to inﬁnity. Thus,
the k×rth replica economy’s counterpart of inequality (1) would be violated at some point.
Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that C and vi are twice continuously diﬀerentiable for any i ∈ N
with (i) C(0) = 0, C0(a) > 0, C00(a) > 0,a n dlima→0 C0(a)=0 ,a n d( i i )v0
i(a) > 0 and
v00
i (a) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N. Then, for any ¯ a>0, there exists a natural number ¯ r(¯ a) such that
for any r ≥ ¯ r(a), a∗(S∗) < ¯ a holds for any (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) ∈ CoreFRP(V r) .
The proof is given in the Appendix B. Together with Theorem 1, Proposition 4 immediately
implies the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose that C and vi are twice continuously diﬀerentiable for any i ∈ N with
(i) C(0) = 0, C0(a) > 0, C00(a) > 0,a n dlima→0 C0(a)=0 ,a n d( i i )v0
i(a) > 0 and v00
i (a) ≤ 0
26for all i ∈ N. Then, the PCPNE public good provision levels shrink to zero as the economy
is replicated.
Although this result has some similarity to the main result of Healy (2007), the mod-
els and the objectives are very diﬀerent; unlike our model, Healy requires that all players
(voluntarily) participate in equilibrium. Note also that unlike Theorem 1, Theorem 2 (and
Proposition 4) relies on concavity and convexity of utility and cost functions, respectively,
as well as diﬀerentiability of them.
6S u m m a r y
This paper has added players’ participation decisions to common agency games. The solu-
tion concept we use is the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE), which is a
natural extension of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium to a dynamic game. We have consid-
ered a special class of common agency games: an environment without conﬂict of interests
(comonotonic preferences), e.g., public goods economies. We have shown that PCPNE is
equivalent to the FRP-core, which is the Pareto-frontier of a union of all core allocations
for the subset of players that are immune to unilateral free-riding incentives; the FRP-core
serves as an intuitive hybrid solution in transferable utility case. With a simple example, we
have found that the equilibrium contribution group may not be consecutive (with respect to
the willingness-to-pay), and the public good may be underprovided than in voluntary con-
tribution game in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). Furthermore, public good provision
relative to the size of economy goes down to zero, as the participants of the economy are
replicated to large numbers.
Appendix A: Preliminary Analysis on the Core of Con-
vex Games
In this appendix, we list a few useful preliminary results on the core of convex games. In
our public goods domain, the characteristic-function game generated from a (public goods)
27economy is convex. Let V :2 N → R with V (∅)=0be a characteristic-function form game.
Game V is convex if V (S ∪T)+V (S ∩T) ≥ V (S)+V (T) for all pairs of subsets S and T of
N.T h ecore of game V is Core(N,V)={u ∈ RN :
P
i∈N ui = V (N) and
P
i∈S ui ≥ V (S)
for all S ⊂ N}. Shapley (1971) analyzes the properties of the core of convex games in detail.
One of his results useful for us is the following.
Property 1. (Shapley, 1971) Let ω : {1,···,|N|} → N be an arbitrary bijection, and
let uω(1) = V ({ω(1)}), uω(2) = V ({ω(1),ω(2)}) − V ({ω(1)}),..., and uω(|N|) = V (N) −
V (N\{ω(|N|)}). Then, u =( ui)i∈N ∈ Core(N,V),a n dt h es e to fa l ls u c ha l l o c a t i o n sf o r m s
the set of vertices of Core(N,V).
Now, we consider a reduced game, in which outsiders always join coalitions and walk away
with the payoﬀs they could obtain by forming their own coalition. Let T be a proper subset
of N.Ar e d u c e dg a m eo fV on T is ˜ VT :2 T → R such that ˜ VT(S)=V (S∪(N\T))−V (N\T)
for all S ⊆ T. We have the following result.
Property 2. Suppose that V : N → R is a convex game. Let uN\T =( ui)i∈N\T be a core
allocation of a game V : N\T → R. Then, uT ∈ Core(T, ˜ VT) if and only if (uT,u N\T) ∈
Core(N,V).
Proof. First, we show that uT ∈ Core(T, ˜ VT) if (uT,u N\T) ∈ Core(N,V).S i n c e(uT,u N\T) ∈
Core(N,V),
P
i∈S∪(N\T) ui ≥ V (S ∪ (N\T)) holds for all S ⊂ T. Rewriting this, we
have
P
i∈S ui ≥ V (S ∪ (N\T)) −
P
i∈N\T ui = V (S ∪ (N\T)) − V (N\T)=˜ VT(S).T h u s ,
uT ∈ Core(T, ˜ V ).
Second, we show that uT ∈ Core(T, ˜ VT) implies (uT,u N\T) ∈ Core(N,V).S u p p o s et h i s











Since uT ∈ Core(T, ˜ V ) and V is a convex game, we have
P
i∈S∩T ui ≥ V (S ∪ (N\T)) −
V (N\T) ≥ V (S) − V (S ∩ (N\T)). Substituting this inequality into (2), we have V (S) >
28V (S)−V (S∩(N\T))+
P
i∈S∩(N\T) ui, which leads to a contradiction since uN\T ∈ Core(N\T,V)
implies
P
i∈S∩(N\T) ui ≥ V (S ∩ (N\T)). ¤



















That is, sets Q+(u) and Q−(u) denote the collections of coalitions in which players as a whole
are satisﬁed and unsatisﬁed (in the strict sense) with the utility vector u, respectively. The set
Q0(u) is the collection of coalitions in which players are just indiﬀerent collectively between
deviating and not deviating. Obviously, a utility vector u is in the core, i.e., u ∈ Core(N,V),
if and only if Q−(u)=∅ (or S ∈ Q+(u) ∪ Q0(u) for all S ∈ 2N)a n dN ∈ Q0(u).L e t
η(S,u) ≡ [V (S)−
P
i∈S ui]/|S| be the (per capita) shortage of payoﬀ for coalition S for any
S ∈ Q−(u).L e t
Q
−
max(u) ≡ {S ∈ Q
−(u):η(S,u) ≥ η(S









Using the above deﬁnitions, we now construct an algorithm that starts from an arbitrary
utility vector u and terminates with a core allocation ˆ u.
Algorithm. Let u ∈ RN and let V : N → R be a convex game. Let u(t) be the utility
vector at stage t ∈ R+,a n du(0) = u (the initial value).
(a) Suppose Q−(u)=∅. Then, 2N\{∅} = Q0(u) ∪ Q+(u).I f N ∈ Q0(u(0)), then the
algorithm terminates immediately. Otherwise,
P
i∈N ui >V(N) holds, and we reduce
29each ui for i ∈ N\(∪S∈Q0(u)S) continuously at a common speed as t increases.22 Since
all elements in Q0(u) continue to be in Q0(u(t)), while some of elements of Q+(u(t))
switch to Q0(u(t)) in the process, Q0(u(t)) monotonically expands as t increases. Thus,
N ∈ Q0(u(ˆ t)) occurs at some stage ˆ t. Then we terminate the process. The ﬁnal
outcome is ˆ u = u(ˆ t).
(b) Suppose Q−(u) 6= ∅. There are two phases, starting with Phase 1.
i. Phase 1: Start with u(0) = u.F o ra l li ∈ Q−
max(u(t)),i n c r e a s eui continuously at
a common speed. Terminate this phase of the algorithm when Q−
max(u(t)) = ∅ (or
Q−(u(t)) = ∅), and call such t as ˜ t.23
ii. Phase 2: Now, Q−(u(˜ t)) = ∅. Then, we go to the procedure in (a), and we reach
a ﬁnal outcome ˆ u = u(ˆ t) when N ∈ Q0(u(ˆ t)) occurs. ¤
Let Q0(u) ≡∪ S∈Q0(u)S,a n dd e ﬁne
W ≡ {i ∈ N : ∃t ≥ 0 with i ∈ Q
−
max(u(t)) in phase 1 of case (b)},
I ≡ {i ∈ N : i ∈ Q
0(u(0)) in case (a), or i ∈ Q
0(u(˜ t))\W in case (b)},
L ≡ {i ∈ N : i/ ∈ Q
0(u(0)) in case (a), or i/ ∈ Q
0(u(˜ t)) in case (b)}.
These sets will be shown to be collections of players who gain, remain indiﬀerent, and lose
in the above algorithm relative to the initial value u, respectively. By the construction of
the algorithm, the following Lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 1. Set N is partitioned into W, I,a n dL: ˆ ui >u i for all i ∈ W, ˆ ui = ui for all
i ∈ I,a n dˆ ui <u i for all i ∈ L.
22It follows from the deﬁnition of a convex game that ∪Q∈Q0(u)Q = N implies N ∈ Q0(u).T op r o v et h i s
claim, it suﬃces to show that if T,T0 ∈ Q0(u),t h e nT ∪T0 ∈ Q0(u) when Q−(u)=∅ as is assumed. We have





Since T ∩ T0 ∈ Q0(u) ∪ Q+(u),
P
i∈T∩T 0 ui ≥ V (T ∩ T0). Together with the above inequality, this implies
V (T ∪ T0) ≥
P
i∈T∪T 0 ui.S i n c eQ−(u)=∅, T ∪ T0 ∈ Q0(u).
23This process guarantees that every player i ∈ Q−
max(u(t)) at some stage t ∈ [0,˜ t] must belong to some
S0 ∈ Q0(u(˜ t)) at the end of phase 1.
30Proof. Note that the payoﬀ for any player in W does not change in phase 2 of case (b) as
W ⊆∪ S∈Q0(u(˜ t))S.T h u s ,f o ra l li ∈ W, ˆ ui >u i. Given this, the rest is obvious. ¤
This lemma says that the winners, unaﬀected players, and losers of the algorithm are iden-
tiﬁed by sets W, I,a n dL, respectively.
Lemma 2. Consider the above algorithm. In phase 1 of case (b), Q−
max(u(t)) monotonically
expands as t increases for t ∈ [0,˜ t). This phase terminates with Q−(u(˜ t)) = ∅.M o r e o v e r ,
W = limt→˜ t Q−
max(u(t)) ∈ Q0(u(˜ t)),a n dW ∈ Q0(u(ˆ t)).
Proof. As t increases, the payoﬀso fa l lm e m b e r so fQ−
max(u(t)) increase at the same speed;
thus for any S ∈ Q−
max(u(t)), η(S,u(t)) decreases at the same speed. Note that for all other
coalitions T/ ∈ Q−
max(u(t)), η(T,u(t)) decreases at a slower pace (if T ∩ Q−
max(u(t)) 6= ∅)o r
stays constant (if T ∩ Q−
max(u(t)) = ∅). Therefore, Q−
max(u(t)) monotonically expands as t
increases. This monotonic utility-raising process continues until Q−(u(t)) = ∅ realizes at
t = ˜ t.S i n c eQ−
max(u(t)) monotonically expands, W = limt→˜ t Q−
max(u(t)) holds.




max(u),w h i c hp r o v e sW ∈ Q0(u(˜ t))
and W ∈ Q0(u(ˆ t)) (in phase 2 of case (b), payoﬀs of players in W are not aﬀected). Let
S1,S 2 ∈ Q−












By convexity, it follows that
V (S1 ∪ S2)+V (S1 ∩ S2) ≥ V (S1)+V (S2)




















ui − V (S1 ∩ S2)
















Thus, S1 ∪ S2 ∈ Q−




Lemma 3. Starting from any initial value u ∈ RN, this algorithm terminates with a core
allocation ˆ u ∈ Core(N,V).
Proof. First, we show that case (a) terminates with a core allocation. To this end, we
need only show that ∪S∈Q0(u)S 6= N whenever
P
i∈N ui >V(N) (otherwise, the algorithm
terminates with an infeasible u). Suppose to the contrary that
P
i∈N ui >V (N), while
∪S∈Q0(u)S = N in case (a). Let S1,S 2,...,SK ∈ Q0(u) be distinct subsets of N with ∪K
k=1Sk =
N. Then, we have
P
i∈S1 ui = V (S1) and
P
i∈S2 ui = V (S2).B y c o n v e x i t y , V (S1 ∪ S2)+




i∈S2 ui holds. By the construction of the
algorithm, S1 ∩ S2 ∈ Q0(u) or S1 ∩ S2 ∈ Q+(u), i.e., V (S1 ∩ S2) ≤
P
i∈S1∩S2 ui holds. Thus,
we have V (S1 ∪ S2) ≥
P
i∈S1∪S2 ui. Applying the same argument to S1 ∪ S2 and S3,w e
have V (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3) ≥
P
i∈S1∪S2∪S3 ui,s i n c e(S1 ∪ S2) ∩ S3 ⊂ S3 implies (S1 ∪ S2) ∩ S3 ∈







i∈N ui. This is a contradiction. Thus, in case
(a), the algorithm terminates with a feasible allocation. Since u(t) changes continuously,
N ∈ Q0(ˆ u) holds, and ˆ u ∈ Core(N,V).
Now, it follows from Lemma 2 that phase 1 of case (b) terminates with Q−(˜ u)=∅.T h u s ,
t h es a m ea r g u m e n ta si nc a s e( a )a p p l i e st op h a s e2o fc a s e( b ) ,l e a d i n gt ot h ec o n c l u s i o n
that ˆ u ∈ Core(N,V) also in case (b). ¤
32Appendix B: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
First, we construct a strategy proﬁle σ, which will be shown to support (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗),
where u∗ ∈ CoreFRP(S∗), as a PCPNE. In deﬁning σ, we assign a CPNE utility proﬁle to
every subgame S0. Then, we show by way of contradiction that there is no credible and
proﬁtable deviation from σ.
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle in the second stage σ2 is generated from utility allocations assigned in
each subgame (we utilize truthful strategies that support utility outcomes). We partition the
set of subgames S = {S0 ∈ 2N : S0 6= ∅} into three categories: S1 = {S∗} on the equilibrium
path, S2 = {S0 ∈ S : S0 ∩ S∗ = ∅},a n dS3 = {S0 ∈ S\S1 : S0 ∩ S∗ 6= ∅}. As Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) show, a CPNE outcome in a subgame S0 corresponds to a core allocation for
S0. In order to support the equilibrium path (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗), we need to show that there is
no credible deviation in the ﬁrst stage. Since a credible deviation requires both free-riding-
proofness and proﬁtability, utility level ¯ ui =m a x {u∗
i,v i(S0\{i})} plays an important role as
t ow h e t h e ro rn o tp l a y e ri joins a coalitional deviation.
We construct a core allocation for subgame S0 with the algorithm described in the Ap-
pendix A, starting with the initial value ¯ u. Then we show that if there exists a credi-
ble deviation by coalition T,w h i c hi n d u c e s(S0,a ∗(S0),u 0) from (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗),t h e n(S \
S∗,a ∗(S \S∗),(u0
i)i∈S0\S∗,(vj(a∗(S0 \S∗)))j6∈S0\S∗) ∈ CoreFRP(S0 \S∗) and Pareto-dominates
(S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗). This is a contradiction to the presumption that (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) ∈ CoreFRP.
Thus, we will conclude that there is no credible deviation from (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗).
The construction of the core allocation for each subgame is as follows.
1. We assign (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) ∈ CoreFRP to the on-equilibrium subgame S∗.
2. For any S0 with S0 ∩ S∗ = ∅, we assign an extreme point of the core for S0 of a
convex game. For an arbitrarily selected order ω over S0,w ea s s i g np a y o ﬀ vector
uω(1) = V ({ω(1)}) − V (∅), uω(2) = V ({ω(1),ω(2)}) − V ({ω(1)}),a n ds oo n ,f o l l o w i n g
Shapley (1971). Call this allocation ˆ uS0 ∈ Core(S0,V) (see Property 1 in the Appendix
33A).
3. For any S0 with S0 ∩ S∗ 6= ∅, we assign a core allocation in the following man-
ner. It requires a few steps. First, we deal with the outsiders S0 \ S∗.L e t ω :
{1,···,|S0\S∗|} → S0\S∗ be an arbitrary bijection, and let ˆ uω(1) = V ({ω(1)}), ˆ uω(2) =
V ({ω(1),ω(2)}) − V ({ω(1)}),···, ˆ uω(|S0\S∗|) = V (S0\S∗) − V ((S0\S∗)\{ω(|S0\S∗|)}).
Such a core allocation minimizes the total payoﬀsf o rS0\S∗ (Shapley, 1971). The
rest V (S0) − V (S0\S∗) goes to S0 ∩ S∗. Consider a reduced game of (S0,V) on
S0 ∩ S∗ with uS0\S∗ as given above and ˜ VS0∩S∗ :2 S0∩S∗ → R such that ˜ VS0∩S∗(Q)=
V (Q∪(S0\S∗))−
P
j∈S0\S∗ uj = V (Q∪(S0\S∗))−V (S0\S∗). By Property 2, we know
that uS0∩S∗ ∈ Core(S0 ∩ S∗, ˜ VS0∩S∗) if and only if (uS0∩S∗,u S0\S∗) ∈ Core(S0,V).F o r
each i ∈ S0 ∩ S∗,l e t¯ ui =m a x {u∗
i,v i(S0\{i})}. By the algorithm in Appendix A, we
construct a core allocation ˆ uS0∩S∗ from vector ¯ uS0∩S∗ =( ¯ ui)i∈S0∩S∗ for the reduced game
˜ VS0∩S∗ of game V :2 S0 → R.
We support these core allocations by truthful strategies. Let σ1
i =1for i ∈ S∗,a n dσ1
i =0
for i/ ∈ S∗.L e t σ2
i[S∗] be a truthful strategy relative to a∗(S∗) such that σ2
i[S∗](a∗(S∗)) =
vi(a∗(S∗)) − u∗
i for all i ∈ S∗,a n dl e tσ2
i[S0] be a truthful strategy relative to a∗(S0) with
σ2
i[S0](a∗(S0)) = vi(a∗(S0)) − ˆ ui(S0) for all i ∈ S0. Since a core allocation with truthful
strategies is assigned to every subgame, it is a CPNE. If there is a deviation from σ,t h e r e f o r e ,
it must happen in the ﬁrst stage.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists a coalition T that proﬁtably and credibly
deviates from the equilibrium σ. Note that in the reduced game played by T,i tm u s tb ea
PCPNE deviation with σ0
T for given σ−T. In the original equilibrium, S∗ is the contribution
group. This implies that every i ∈ (N\S∗)\T plays σ1
i =0 , i.e., free-riding, in the ﬁrst stage,
while every i ∈ S∗\T plays σ1
i =1in the ﬁrst stage and engages in the same strategy, i.e.,
the prescribed menu σ2
i(S0) contingent to group S0, in the second stage. Any i ∈ T\S∗ has
chosen σ1
i =0but chooses σ10
i =1upon deviation in the ﬁrst stage. Whereas i ∈ T ∩S∗ may
or may not choose σ10
i =1 . Some may choose to free-ride by switching to 0,w h i l eo t h e r s
stay in the contribution group, adjusting their strategies in the second stage. To summarize,
34let S0 be the contribution group formed as a result of T’s deviation, i.e., S0 = S(σ1
−T,σ 10
T).
Then, there are ﬁve groups of players to be considered (see Figure 2).
(i) the members of S∗\S0 ⊂ T that switch to free-riding after the deviation,
(ii) the members of S0\S∗ ⊂ T that join the contribution group upon deviation,
(iii) the members of (S∗ ∩ S0)\T ⊂ S0 that still participate in the contribution group after
the deviation, with the same prescribed menu in the second stage,
(iv) the members of (S∗ ∩ S0) ∩ T ⊂ S0 that change their strategies in the second stage,
(v) the members of N\(S0 ∪ S∗) that are outsiders both before and after the deviation.
Let the resulting allocation be (S0,a ∗(S0),u 0). Since the deviation is proﬁtable and credi-
ble, the members of T, i.e., those who are categorized in (i), (ii), and (iv) are better oﬀ after















i ≥ ¯ ui for all i ∈ (S
∗ ∩ S
0) ∩ T,
where ¯ ui =m a x {u∗
i,v i(a∗(S0\{i})}.
Given our supposition, the following claims must be true.
F i r s tw ec l a i mt h a tm e m b e r so f( i i )e x i s ta n dt h a ta∗(S0) >a ∗(S∗) as they are better oﬀ
after the deviation. The set of players in (ii) is nonempty, since otherwise S0 ⊂ S∗ and a
coalitional deviation by T cannot be proﬁtable as (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) is a core allocation.
Claim 1. S0\S∗ 6= ∅ and a∗(S0) >a ∗(S∗).
Since all players use truthful strategies in the strategy proﬁle σ even after T’s deviation,
the members in (iii) (outsiders of T) obtain the same payoﬀ vector ˆ u(S∗∩S0)\T(S0) as in the
original subgame CPNE for S0. I ti sb e c a u s ei ns u b g a m eS0 (even after deviation), a∗(S0)
must be provided as a CPNE (core) must be assigned to the subgame. Thus, we have the
following for group (iii).
35Claim 2. After the deviation by T,e v e r yi ∈ (S∗ ∩ S0)\T ⊂ S0 receives exactly u0
i =ˆ ui.
Since u0 needs to be a CPNE payoﬀ vector in the second stage of the reduced game by
T,w eh a v e
P
i∈S0\S∗ u0
i ≥ V (S0\S∗) for uS0 to be in Core(S0,V). By the construction of ˆ uS0,
on the other hand, we have
P





i ≥ V (S0\S∗)=
P
i∈S0\S∗ ˆ ui.







P r o o fo fC l a i m4 .Group (iv) consists of members of W, I,a n dL.N o t et h a tu0
i ≥ ¯ ui for
any i ∈ S0 ∩ S∗ ∩ T since otherwise they would have no incentive to join the deviation.
First consider the set W of winners in group (iv); we have ˆ ui ≥ ¯ ui by the deﬁnition of









where the equality holds by Lemma 2. As for players in I,w eh a v eˆ ui =¯ ui by deﬁnition.
Thus, it follows from u0
i ≥ ¯ ui that u0
i ≥ ˆ ui for any i ∈ I.P a y o ﬀs for losers, by deﬁnition,
must satisfy ˆ ui < ¯ ui,s ow eh a v eu0
i > ˆ ui because u0




































i∈S0∩S∗∩T ˆ ui. ¤






i∈S0\S∗ ˆ ui = V (S0\S∗)
The ﬁnal claim follows from Claim 5 and the supposition that the deviation by T is
proﬁtable and credible.
Claim 6. Consider a deviation by S0 ∪ S∗ such that S0 \ S∗ is the resulting contribu-
tion group (all members in S∗ stop contributing). Then the allocation (S0 \ S∗,a ∗(S0 \
S∗),(u0
i)i∈S0\S∗,(vj(a∗(S0\S∗)))j/ ∈S0\S∗) is in CoreFRP(S0\S∗) and Pareto-dominates (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗).




























i∈S0\S∗ vi(a∗(S∗)), and hence a∗(S0\S∗) >a ∗(S∗).
Now, since the deviation by T is credible, and hence u0
i ≥ vi(a∗(S0 \{i})) ≥ vi(a∗((S0 \S∗)\
{i})) for any i ∈ S0 \ S∗, Claim 5 implies that (S0 \ S∗,a ∗(S0 \ S∗),(u0
i)i∈S0\S∗,(vj(a∗(S0 \
S∗)))j/ ∈S0\S∗) ∈ CoreFRP(S0 \ S∗).
Next, we show that ((u0
i)i∈S0\S∗,(vj(a∗(S0 \ S∗)))j/ ∈S0\S∗) Pareto-dominates u∗.F i r s t ,t h e
proﬁtability of the deviation by T immediately implies that u0
i ≥ vi(a∗(S∗)) = u∗
i for any
i ∈ S0 \ S∗. Thus, we have shown the Pareto-domination for group (ii). Pareto-domination
for group (v) is immediate from a∗(S0 \ S∗) >a ∗(S∗). As for groups (i), (iii), and (iv), i.e.,
for all i ∈ S∗,w eﬁr s tn o t et h a ts i n c eu∗ ∈ Core(S∗) and the game V is convex, we have
37u∗
i ≤ V (S∗) − V (S∗\{i}) (Shapley 1971). Now,
V (S















































where the last inequality holds since
P
j∈S∗\{i} vj(a)−C(a) is maximized at a = a∗(S∗\{i}).
This proves that all members of groups (i), (iii), and (iv) are better oﬀ in the allocation
(S0\S∗,a ∗(S0\S∗),(u0
i)i∈S0\S∗,(vj(a∗(S0\S∗)))j/ ∈S0\S∗). Hence, we conclude that (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) ∈
CoreFRP is Pareto-dominated by (S0\S∗,a ∗(S0\S∗),(u0
i)i∈S0\S∗,(vj(a∗(S0\S∗)))j/ ∈S0\S∗),w h i c h
is in CoreFRP(S0\S∗). ¤
The statement of Claim 6 is an apparent contradiction to (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) ∈ CoreFRP.
Thus, we have shown that there is no proﬁtable and credible deviation from the constructed
strategy proﬁle σ,s oσ is a PCPNE.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Suppose to the contrary that for all natural number n,t h e r ee x i s t sr ≥ n such that
(Sr,a ∗(Sr),u ∗
r) ∈ CoreFRP(V r) and a∗(Sr) ≥ ¯ a. This implies that there exists an increasing
sequence of natural numbers r that satisfy (Sr,a ∗(Sr),u ∗
r) ∈ CoreFRP(V r).W e s h o w t h a t
(under this supposition) for any r with (Sr,a ∗(Sr),u ∗
r) ∈ CoreFRP(V r) and any iq ∈ Sr,









diminishes to zero (since v0
i(a∗(S)) ≤ v0
i(¯ a) < ∞). Since C(a∗(S)) ≥ C(¯ a) > 0,t h i si m -
plies that (1) is violated eventually as r →∞ , which in turn leads to a contradiction to
(Sr,a ∗(Sr),u ∗
r) ∈ CoreFRP(V r).
38Now, a∗(Sr), the public good provision level induced by the contribution group Sr,i s















iq(a). For any r, the left-hand side of (4) is continuous and
strictly decreasing in the public good provision level a since v00
j ≤ 0 and C00 > 0 (as Figure 3
illustrates). Similarly, for any iq ∈ Sr, the optimality of public good provision requires that
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∗(Sr \{ iq})) = 0,
where the second term in the second equation represents the free-rider iq’s marginal beneﬁt
from the public good provision.
Now, we claim that for any   ∈ (0,¯ a), there exists a positive integer r  such that for any








∗(Sr) −  ) −
v0




∗(Sr) −  ) > 0,
i.e., the left-hand side of (5), evaluated at a = a∗(Sr)−  instead of a∗(Sr \{ iq}), is positive
as Figure 3 shows. Together with v00
j ≤ 0 and C00 > 0,t h i si m p l i e st h a ta∗(Sr \{ iq}) ∈
(a∗(Sr) −  ,a∗(Sr)), which in turn implies the convergence of a∗(Sr \{ iq}) to a∗(Sr).
To show the claim, we ﬁrst deﬁne the minimum C00 over the relevant range as c ≡
mina∈[0,a∗(N)] C00(a).I tf o l l o w sf r o mC00 > 0 that c>0.N o w ,f o ra n yr, it follows from (4)
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w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dv00
j ≤ 0 to derive the last inequality. On the other hand, it follows from
v0
i(a∗(Sr) −  ) ≤ v0
i(¯ a −  ) (as a∗(Sr) > ¯ a)t h a tt h e r ee x i s t sr  such that
v0

















∗(Sr) −  ) −
v0





















∗(Sr \{ iq}))] → 0 as r →∞ .
Since C(a∗(S)) >C (¯ a) > 0, we have shown that there exists ¯ r(¯ a) such that for any r ≥ ¯ r(¯ a),
the free-riding-proofness condition (1) fails to be satisﬁed, which implies that a∗(S∗) < ¯ a for
any (S∗,a ∗(S∗),u ∗) ∈ CoreFRP(V r) when r ≥ ¯ r(¯ a).
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